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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE FINANCIAL REPORTING
Accounting failures have become rampant and more pervasive,
undermining the credibility of the accounting profession and the inherent
reliability of the financial reporting model as an evaluative tool in shaping
investor confidence and awareness. The financial statements, comprised
essentially of the balance sheet, the income statement, and the statement of
cash flows, purport to transmit the financial data of an entity or group of
entities into a proscribed format that stakeholders of that entity can use as a
means of evaluating the financial health and viability of that entity. The
various stakeholders could include shareholders, management, creditors,
bondholders, regulatory agencies, and other interested parties, which may
have an interest in the corporation. These interests can be economic, social,
or regulatory in nature. The information presented in financial statements
is both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative information can include the
core financial statements, supplementary statements, and footnote disclosure.
Qualitative information is principally contained in the Management
Discussion and Analysis section ofthe financial statements ofa Securities and
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Exchange Commission (SEC) registrant, but can also be contained in the
footnotes to the financial statements, which act as explanatory comments to
the financial statements. Several self-regulating accountancy bodies,
described in detail in the following section, prescribe the format of the
financial statements. The regulations that govern the methodology used in
developing the quantitative amounts and qualitative disclosures in the
financial statements and their presentation in them are calledgenerally accepted
accountingprinciples, typically known as GAAP. The regulations governing
audit methodology, and the techniques that must generally be followed in
the conduct of the audit, are known as generally accepted auditing standards,
better known through the acronym GAAS.
Financial statements must be able to accurately and faithfully convey the
economic substance of a transaction, over a period of time, and as of a given
date. The balance sheet captures financial data as of a particular point in
time; the income statement captures that data over a period of time, usually
the fiscal year of the entity. Financial information presented in these
statements must be able to be accurately compared to financial statements of
other entities. These other entities may or may not be within the same
industry as the target company. The financial statements must convey the
economic substance ofthe transaction rather than merely the economic form
of it. This substance over form doctrine has been widely accepted as the
prevailing standard in evaluating the nature of a transaction. Transparency
and comparability have been the goalposts towards which the accounting
profession and the SEC have driven to. Comparability between financial
statements ensures that creditors and investors will make meaningful
investing decisions based on financial statements that faithfully convey the
underlying economic position of the entity. If comparability does not exist,
either because of intentional misapplication of accounting standards or
through misinterpretation of the standards, the financial statements and any
assessments derived from them are meaningless and will convey fiction
rather than truth. Misleading financial statements can potentially wreak
havoc on investors, creditors and lenders, and undermine the credibility of
the capital markets. If financial statements and the results derived from their
analysis cannot be relied upon, to whom may the third parties turn to for
reliable and accurate assessments of entity performance? Special interests
may attempt to manipulate financial statements to derive conclusions and
outcomes favorable to their interests.
The accounting regulatory and standard setting model fashioned by the
SEC has consistently displayed ineffective policies in addressing its primary
accounting oversight goals of standard setting and auditor regulation. The
SEC has failed to curb creative accounting and earnings management by
public corporations through its oversight of the private Financial Accounting
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Standards Board (FASB) and the FASB's issuance of extensive and detailed
accounting standards. Recently, the SEC has aggressively encroached on
traditional accounting enforcement and self-regulatory schemes in slowing
the growth of the multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) and significantly
strengthening auditor independence rules. This flawed oversight of the
financial reporting and regulatory model in the United States has helped
usher in a period of standardsoverload and increased investor confusion over
the comparability and credibility of financial statements while temporarily
curbing the voracious appetites of the worlds largest multidisciplinary
practices: the Big 5. This Comment will first address the implications and
problems created by standards overload, which principally include a marked
decline in financial statement comparability and transparency, and a brief
review of the historical regulatory scheme and the interaction between the
many disparate regulatory bodies. The Comment will then proceed to
discuss the means through which earnings are manipulated and the SEC's
role in curbing the problem. An alternative theory of earnings manipulation
will be reviewed, as well as how the current regulatory structure has enabled
companies to engage in creative accounting and earnings management. The
Comment will then discuss the government's response to traditional selfregulation and the SEC's new independence rule. Finally, future
developments and trends that would ensure financial reporting objectivity
and comparability will be discussed and highlighted.
Blame for the many accounting failures has been widespread, shared in
equal parts by incompetent or fraudulent management, coercive tendencies
on auditors by management, inadequate standard setting by the regulatory
bodies which promulgate these standards, poor enforcement of auditor
behavior, and, ironically, strict compliance with inadequate standards (the so
called cookbook dilemma). While fraud is often believed to be the single most
prevalent factor in creating an environment of earnings management, it is the
premise of this Comment that strict compliance with standards is just as
likely to produce misleading financial statements, as they are to produce
meaningful and transparent statements on which the public can place
reliance. The Byzantine methods through which earnings can be
manipulated must first be understood through the prism of the regulatory
mechanism. It is to this mechanism to which we now turn.
I1. CREATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS & REGULATIONS AND

REGULATORY INTERACTION

Before discussing the implications and consequences ofstandardsoverload,
it is important to understand the backdrop against which these standards are
created. The SEC, established in 1934 by congressional legislation, is an
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independent federal regulatory agency which possesses the "authority to
prescribe the form and content of financial statements contained in
registration statements accompanying an offer to sell securities to the public
and in subsequent periodic reports filed with the commission."' Those
companies listed on national securities exchanges, or traded in the over-thecounter market, or have issued securities in interstate markets, may be
subject to thejurisdiction of the SEC.2 In their zeal to attract corporations to
become domiciled in their states, state governments often prescribed and
enacted legislation incompatible with the requirements of adequate and
reliable public disclosure of information.3 The federal response to these
inconsistencies and inadequacies in state laws led to their harmonization
through the establishment ofthe SEC. 4 "The SEC also exercises supervisory
authority over auditing standards and procedures, including the standards of
auditor independence."' In addition to its regulatory authority over the flow
of information published by the registrant's, and its supervisory authority
over auditing standards and procedures, the SEC administers a series of acts
only peripherally related to these core duties. 6 "The SEC is composed of five
full-time members, known as commissioners, who are appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate." 7 A series of regulations proscribe
and limit political affiliations and ties among the commissioners!8 The
current and outgoing chairman is Arthur Levitt Jr.9 The SEC's staff is
composed of close to 3000 employees, from which the chief accountant is the
principal adviser to the commissioners on accounting related matters.'
The SEC has traditionally delegated its authority as the standard setter
and its authority over auditing standards and procedures to an alphabet soup
of private regulatory bodies that have evolved over time. The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), comprised in 1973 as the result of
previous failed standard setting attempts, is the primary private standard
setter, and is composed of seven full-time members and overseen and funded
by the trustees ofthe independent Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF)."
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The SEC has generally acquiesced to the rules and standards adopted by the
FASB, otherwise known as (GAAP). The FAF's Board of Trustees is
comprised of sixteen members, who represent various private and public
interests. 12 The FASB's principal pronouncement is known as a Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards, which is enacted only after extensive
deliberation and regard for due process. 3 Delegation of the SEC's
supervisory authority over auditing standards and procedures has been
primarily directed towards the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), the national professional organization of certified
public accountants.4
Interaction between these three regulatory bodies has historically been
tempestuous and strained. 5 Publicly though, the SEC and the FASB remain
in almost daily contact and continue to emphasize the deliberative roles each
has on the other. 6 Additionally, significant movement of personnel between
both bodies has occurred, further enhancing the public image of
complementary, rather then adversarial or conflictive, roles. 7 This public
image belies significant tension between the SEC and the FASB. Both
bodies engaged each other as early as the 1940s and 1950s in a series of
fundamental debates that would shape and help define the nature of financial
reporting." These issues included inter-period tax allocation, income
statement inclusion concepts, stock options, and upward asset revaluations.' 9
Throughout the mid to late '60s, the executive branch actively intervened in
blocking or deferring the FASB's predecessor, the Accounting Principles
Board, from implementing its accounting for the investment credit, which
was intended to provide businesses with a tax credit equal to a percentage of
the cost of newly purchased equipment and machinery. 2 The APB
supported a deferred approach through which the credit would be realized
Successive administrations
incrementally in annual installments.2'
supported, on policy reasons, the immediate realization of the tax credit
against current income7 2 The tension over the investment tax credit lasted
for over eight years, and purportedly ended when the SEC announced that
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it would abide by the APB's recommendation. 23 The Treasury Department,
though, obtained direct congressional approval for disallowance of the APB
position. 24 This was the first instance in which a government department,
aided by Congress, would intervene in such direct and unrestrained fashion
in the private standard setting process.2 s
The threat of direct SEC intervention grew over time and was
precipitated by pressures applied by disparate constituencies and their lobbies
in attempts to coerce and manipulate the financial reporting model and the
standard setters. 26 Tensions between the SEC and the private standardsetters were reflected not only in the standard setting arena, but also in the
composition of the standard setting bodies themselves. In 1996, the FAF,
under extreme pressure from the SEC, restructured the ranks of its Board of
Trustees. Since its inception, the FAF Board had consisted of sixteen
accounting and financial professionals, of whom three were from the
governmental accounting sector, ten were from the corporate sector, and
three were purportedly independent. 2' As the FAF appoints the seven
members of the FASB and its ancillary Board, the five members of the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), its structure and
composition are viewed and perceived as significant in the standard setting
process.9 The SEC,fearing significant and far reaching recommendations
by the FAF for structural changes to the FASB, viewed the proposed changes
"as a ploy to instill greater corporate control over the FASB process."30 In a
battle of epic proportions and open hostility, the chairperson of the SEC,
Arthur Levitt, and the chairperson of the FAF, Michael Cook, engaged in
heated and intense negotiations over these changes. 3 In the end, the SEC
prevailed, and managed to restructure the Board of the FAF with eight
corporate seats and eight non-corporate or disinterested seats; balance had
been achieved.32 One observer was quoted as saying, "I think this move is
very constructive, it avoids that situation of having inmates in charge of the
institution."33 The same observer noted that an FAF dominated by corporate
and public accountants worked well until the age of increased competition
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decreased auditors' independence, a fact he believes renders auditors more
susceptible to the desires of corporate clients. 34 A more serious compromise
of accounting standards occurred several years before this face-off, when the
FASB was working on a new standard for stock based compensation.3" A
proposed draft of the statement was anathema to major corporations, which36
would have required them to report stock option compensation as expenses.
The corporations and the major accounting firms intensely lobbied Congress
to pass a resolution against the FASB's proposals, in an effort to scuttle
them.3 v The U.S. Senate acquiesced, and the resulting standard was
significantly modified from the original draft, which required only disclosure
of the effects of the stock option compensation rather than their
recordation.38 Many viewed the compromise as a significant fault line and
breach of the integrity of the FASB3
While indirect congressional and executive oversight had been achieved
through the efforts of SEC intervention and Senate resolutions, direct
congressional oversight of the regulatory scheme was largely absent until
Representative John Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the Committee on
Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives, requested a comprehensive
review of the status of the accounting profession in 1996 by the General
Accounting Office (GAO).' This review entailed the most comprehensive
assessment of the financial reporting system and self-regulatory model to
date, and served to identify and highlight significant weaknesses in these
systems. The report would eventually be used as a springboard to further
enhance the SEC's direct regulation of the standard setting and selfregulatory processes. The GAO identified five major issues: 1) Auditor
independence (independence in fact and in appearance from the audit client);
2) Auditor's responsibilities for fraud and internal controls; 3) Audit quality;
4) The accounting and auditing standard setting processes and the
effectiveness of financial reporting, and 5) The role of the auditor in the
further enhancement of financial reporting.4' The GAO report noted that
despite corrective actions initiated by the accounting profession in an effort
to strengthen auditor independence, significant concerns remained, and
would become exacerbated as the profession moved to provide new services
34
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outside of the traditional and core niches.42 More significantly however, the
GAO report noted that user participation in the standard setting processes
and the pressures brought to bear on the FASB by the many constituent
lobbies which seek to influence accounting standards remain areas of
heightened concern.43 It further noted:
[Ulser representation and participation remains lower than other
groups, making it difficult to produce standards that have a bounce
perspective in meeting users needs. In practice, audit standard
setting has been primarily the domain of the accounting profession.
Auditing standards have been influenced by auditors' liability
concerns and perceptions of a lack of cost benefit that have
constrained the scope of audit. The SEC, which has ultimate
authority for standard setting and responsibility for protecting the
public interest, has not always strongly asserted that role in its
relationship with the standard setters. Recently, the SEC expressed
strong views that the majority of the FAF trustees should be public
representatives as a means to strengthen both the substance and
perceptions of FASB's independence, and reached agreement with
FAF that trustee membership will be bounced between constituent
and public members. GAO believes the SEC's recent attention to
strengthening standard setting is a step in the right direction."
Regarding the SEC's vigilance and oversight of the private standard setting
process, the GAO stated:
[I]t is important that the SEC continue to monitor the operation of
the standard setting process to insure FASB's ability to objectively set
standards.... It is essential that any changes made to improve the
efficiency of FASB's operations do not adversely affect its
independence as the standard setters since independence is critical
to achieving acceptance of the standard setting process .... GAO
believes that the SEC has not always strongly asserted leadership in
its relationship with the standard setters and that more progress
could be achieved in resolving major issues facing the standard
setters if that were to occur. The SEC's recent action resulting in

43
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restructuring FAF
is a prime example of progress achieved through
4
SEC leadership. 5
It is clear that the GAO report, while issued in 1996, strongly foreshadowed
the impending debates regarding auditor independence, the multidisciplinary
practice of accounting, and the SEC's increased role over the standard setting
and self-regulation processes.
M. EXAMPLES OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND CREATIVE
ACCOUNTING

The GAO report clearly detailed perceived weaknesses in the standard
setting and self-regulatory processes, yet failed to clearly define a little
recognized plague creeping through financial America: the threat of creative
accounting and earnings management. Creative accounting and earnings
management occurs when organizations are tempted to manipulate earnings
through the creative application of accounting principles, or through flagrant
abuse in the application of those principles. Earnings management is a byproduct of the perceived need to inflate earnings to meet or exceed Wall
Street expectations.46 These expectations are created as a result of consensus
opinions generated by the hundreds of analysts on Wall Street.47 Failure to
achieve or reach these expectations can create powerful downward pulls on
company stock valuations and affect both shareholder value and employee
compensation through the devaluation or worthlessness of stock option
incentives. Powerful incentives to reach elusive earnings expectations can
create serious conflicts of interest among corporate executives eager to meet
these expectations. Several academic theories have developed to both explain
and regulate creative accounting and earnings management. SEC Chairman
Arthur LevittJr. championed the most pervasive and widely accepted of these
theories in 1998 in his speech to the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants.' In essence, this speech served as the bellwether for the
SEC's efforts to enforce and prosecute those individuals and organizations
it felt were engaging in widespread and pervasive earnings management. In
it, Mr. Levitt characterized the process of earnings management as a game
among market participants and one that would have serious repercussions

45

Id. at 15.
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YORK LAWJOURNAL, Feb. 1999, at 9, availableat LIS-NEXS, News Group File.
47
Id.
48

JOURNAL,
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and adverse consequences for America's financial reporting system. 49 He
implied nothing short of subtle collusion between corporate managers,
auditors, and analysts and acknowledged a perversion ofcorporate accounting
was occurring on a massive scale, which undermined the integrity of the
financial reporting system?' ° Mr. Levitt's outline of the game was striking in
its simplicity:
Companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in
order to grow market capitalization an increase the value of stock
options. Their ability to do this depends on achieving the earnings
expectations of analysts. And analysts seek constant guidance from
companies to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want to retain
their clients, are under pressure not to stand in the way."
The method of achieving earnings management primarily involves the
use of accounting techniques created primarily to allow and encourage
companies to be flexible in the recording of their transactions in order to
facilitate the primary goal of generally accepted accounting principles, that of
ensuring substance over form in the recognition of an accounting transaction
whenever possible. This flexibility is also encouraged because the standard
setters are wise enough to realize that every new or unique business
arrangement or transaction cannot be anticipated or somehow bullied into
conforming to existing accounting rules and regulations.5 2 Earnings
management occurs when this flexibility is exploited in an effort to conceal
financial volatility. 3 Mr. Levitt then provided significant illustrations of the
methods by which earnings can be successfully managed and shaped to
accomplish the desired result.
Levitt called the first of these methods "big bath restructuring charges,"
where "a company overstates its restructuring charges to clean up its balance
sheet, takes a large one time earnings hit, and then later reverses some of
those charges and adds them back into income in a period in which earnings
would otherwise fall short.5 4 This method of enhancing future earnings is
surprisingly simple and even encouraged by Wall Street analysts. Under
generally accepted accounting principles, when a company commits itself to
exit a business or close a factory in the near future, it must estimate and
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record the total costs that it may eventually incur in the year in which the
decision was made, although most of the costs associated with the
restructuring will occur in the future."5 These charges include items such as
severance costs and costs to facilitate plant closings, and significantly dampen
the initial years earnings and profits, although the costs may not be paid for
many years to come.56 These costs are accumulated in liability accounts
called reserves, which may be adjusted up or down depending on actual costs
incurred in the restructuring. Manipulation occurs because companies
purposely overestimate the restructuring charges in an effort to cleanse the
balance sheet in the current year and absorb the negative earnings related to
the restructuring, yet reverse the charges in future years, creatingfalse income
from the reversal of the reserves.57 Analysts overlook the initial years'
overstatement (big bath) as bitter medicine, and look only to the operating
results for their analysis of future earnings growth. Companies may also
improperly channel impermissible costs through the restructuring charge
byline, charging earnings in the current year that are properly chargeable to
succeeding years.5 9 Intentional inflation of future earnings and deflation of
current earnings is only one-way in which charges can be successfully used
to manipulate shareholder confidence.
Cookiejar reserves are charges that are used to lower and smooth current
year income in periods of earnings volatility by creating unrealistic estimates
of liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses, or warranty costs.'
Wall Street disapproves of earnings volatility in general, and frequently seeks
incremental earnings growth rather than unexpected changes. Companies
that have outperformed analysts' growth expectations in the current year, will
frequently fear successive years' growth expectations, and will seek to modify
those expectations by lowering current year earnings through these charges.6'
These accruals are then reversed when financial fortunes have dipped.62
This variant of the big bath charge is easily concealed from even astute
investors or outside directors, which makes accurate company valuation very
difficult if not impossible.'
55
Carol Loomis,Lies, DamnedLies, andManaged Earnings,FORTUNE,Aug. 2, 1999, at 74, available
at LEXIS-NEXIS, News Group File.
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Levitt next assailed improper revenue recognition, whereby companies
manipulate earnings through improper revenue recognition techniques. 64
Improper revenue recognition occurs when sales are recorded before they are
truly earned.6 5 Of the many areas discussed by Levitt, the wrongful booking
of sales appears as the most closely related to outright fraud. 6 Generally,
accepted accounting principles are very conservative and straightforward in
their approach to revenue recognition.' Many of the most egregious
accounting scandals have occurred because of improper and fraudulent
revenue recognition, and appeared at high-profile corporations such as
Sensormatic and Sunbeam. 6' Sensormatic invoked the wrath of the SEC by
simply keeping their books open at the end of quarters to meet their earnings
projections.69 Sunbeam recorded as sales goods still residing in its
warehouses." These blatant and flagrant examples of earnings management
probably required subtle collusion between company management, senior
accounting executives, and their auditors, as these abuses are easy to detect
and prevent. A partner at a Big Six accounting firm stresses that
manipulation of revenue usually starts as a modest attempt to lift sales in a
particular quarter, but then escalates into ever more creative schemes, such
as the bill and hold relationship, where customers are invoiced for products
not yet delivered, or creative consignment schemes that allow companies to
return unsold goods.7
Levitt next addressed a topic about which the corporate, audit, and
academic communities have debated endlessly over a period of decades, the
concept and abuse of materiality. This elusive concept has been defined and
re-defined countless times among academicians, auditors and the courts. It
is this uncertainty that has permitted unscrupulous CFO's to manage
earnings by promoting the concept of immateriality when transactions are
being examined and questioned by their auditors or the SEC. Individual
misstatements in the general ledger may often seem immaterial and
inconsequential in nature, but the aggregate, absolute effect of these
misstatements may in fact be quite material and substantial to those
statements. Levitt warned that "in markets where missing an earnings
projection by a penny can result in a loss of millions of dollars in market
(
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capitalization, I have a hard time accepting that some of these so-called non
events simply don't matter, or are immaterial." 7 Materiality has traditionally
been defined in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 73 Auditors and
accountants have traditionally defined quantitative materiality by numerical
benchmarks and standards that purport to strictly define a threshold below
which any given transaction is deemed immaterial. Qualitative materiality
considers the impact of an omission independent of the company's
numerical data. 74 These amorphous definitions have given rise to a wide
variety of techniques among the Big 5 accounting firms and the hundreds of
mid-level firms that have individually attempted to develop specific and
precise methodologies for measuring materiality within the scope ofan audit.
Their techniques have been as widely divergent as the firm cultures
themselves, and have left many experienced auditors confused and uncertain
when "passing" on potential audit adjustments of less than a quarter million
dollars because the materiality threshold for that particular audit was a
quarter million dollars. Less than a year after Levitt's speech in New York,
the SEC published Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 ("SAB No. 99), which
aimed to "provide guidance to auditors and corporate officers in applying
materiality standards to the preparation offinancial statements filed with the
Commission."TS SAB No. 99 "demands that auditors use qualitative elements
to illuminate and expand the traditional quantitative materiality analysis, not
undertake a qualitative analysis completely divorced from the quantitative
analysis."76 This new standard has been roundly criticized, and one comment
notes:
The practical problems of applying SAB No. 99 added to its
philosophical shortcomings. Even if one were to agree that
qualitative factors should be incorporated into the materiality
calculus, a strong case can be made that SAB No. 99 fails to offer a
workable framework with which to incorporate such considerations.
Many attorneys have noted their clients' opinions that SAB No. 99
is too ambiguous in that the staff fails to articulate a precise,
intelligible definition ofqualitative materiality. The SEC should not

7-

Levitt, supra note 48.
Glenn Miller, StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99: Another III-Advised Foray into The Murky World of
QualitativeMateriality, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 361,361-390 (2000).
74
Id. at 363.
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be surprised that the financial community has chided it for releasing
an ambiguous bulletin. 77
Levitt's final and primary assault on the techniques and methodologies
of earnings management occurred in the highly technical field of acquisition
accounting. Creative acquisition accounting involves the judgmental
allocation of values to purchased assets. Traditional merger accounting
requires a purchaser to assign values to purchased assets, capitalize them, and
right- off these assets in future years. 78 Many high-technology companies
though, have sought to assign purchased value to in-process research and
development ("IPR&D"), which must be written off in the current year, and
therefore, do not drag down future earnings. 79 The assignment of maximum
amounts of the purchase price to IPR&D involves much creative judgment
and aggressive valuation techniques.'s
IV. THE SEC's RESPONSE TO EARNINGS MANIPULATION
The SEC's response to the methods of manipulating earnings has been
to encourage stricter compliance with existing accounting rules, greater
enforcement, and policing efforts by the SEC, and widespread cultural
change of the corporate ethos, which encourages such behavior.8 ' Chairman
Levitt outlined a nine-point proposal whose common theme was hypertechnical reliance and adherence to the established standards and a call for
greater specificity within those standards. Indeed, five of Levitt's proposals
addressed the inadequate technical nature of our current standards in
resolving the serious issues outlined above. 2 These proposals were primarily
aimed at requiring the SEC, the AICPA, and the FASB to establish standards
that would clarify and provide guidance on those topics outlined by Levitt as
serious breaches of governance. The sixth proposal would require the SEC
to aggressively target companies that were engaging in those practices and
enhance SEC regulatory oversight of these companies.Y4 The seventh
proposal targets the accounting and auditing industries, requires auditors to
improve the quality of their audits through enhanced supervision, training
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and focus of the auditors, and establishes further review of audit
methodologies by the private standard setting bodies."'
The eighth proposal outlined by Levitt would empower audit
committees with greater authority to independently represent the interests
of shareholders, render impartial judgments, and not remain beholden to
corporate management. 6 Finally, Chairman Levitt challenged corporate
management and Wall Street to re-examine our current environment:
I believe We need to embrace nothing less than cultural change. For
corporate managers, remember, the integrity of the numbers in the
financial reporting system is directly related to the long-term
interests of the Corporation. While the temptations are great, and
the pressures strong, illusions in numbers are only that - ephemeral,
and ultimately self-destructive. To Wall Street, I say look beyond
the latest quarter. Punish those who rely on deception rather than
the practice of openness and transparency.'
Levitt's clarion call for a change in corporate culture, although both farreaching and sincere, remains little more than an amorphous and hopelessly
optimistic wish list, rather than a recognition of the powerful countervailing
forces constantly poised to undermine the credibility and transparency of the
financial reporting model. Corporate, shareholder, and auditor self-interests
remain conflicted with the ideals of financial credibility and integrity. The
unceasing demands of Wall Street ultimately dictate the financial reporting
climate adopted by the subject companies. These demands speak of only one
ideal: that of increasing shareholder value through incremental earnings
growth and realization of analyst projections. This vortex of realization and
incremental earnings growth is readily attainable in high growth economic
climates, but can remain illusory in periods of moderate economic growth
or in stable, well-defined industries. The pressure to accommodate, though,
is relentless, and causes the subtle yet perverse degradation of accounting
standards that ultimately leads to outright fraud.8s Levitt himself understood
this process, when he remarked that "Wall Street itself is an obstacle: it wants
consistent earnings, however attained." 9 One stock analyst boldly urged that
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companies consider hiding earnings for future use and was quoted as saying,
"If you don't play the game, you're going to get hurt."9°
Levitt's review and analysis of the methods of managing earnings and his
detailed nine point plan to combat creative accounting is compliance based
in its approach, and speaks of addressing the problems through more vigilant
enforcement, more good judgment by corporate accounting and auditing
staff, and mounds of new regulations loaded with enough specificity to
circumvent the questionable use of that judgment. Levitt posits that the
problem is one of non-compliance with accounting standards by rogue
entities and treasonous auditors. An alternative theory of corporate
governance holds that Levitt's proposed solutions would simply compound
the problem, rather than assist in correcting them. These theorists argue that
increasing compliance with the growing volume of rules and statutes has
rendered financial statements unserviceable to the very consumers they
purport to protect - the investing public.9
V. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF EARNINGS MANIPULATION

An exhaustive study of corporate failures in Australia by F.L. Clarke,
G.W. Dean and KG. Oliver, explored the notion that greater compliance
with proscribed standards and zealous enforcement of those standards would
achieve serviceable financial standards that were informative and models of
comparability, the SEC's over-arching concern for many decades. 92 Indeed,
in 1972, SEC Chairman William J. Casey stated that "the desirability of
making earnings statements as comparable and as uniform as possible should
gain priority over the frequently conflicting objective of affording
management choice and flexibility in the way it keeps score." 3 The
Australian analysis concludes that even meticulous compliance with
approved accounting standards and strict enforcement by the regulatory
bodies may not produce serviceable financial statements.94 The authors stress
that "compliance with standards then in vogue was as likely to have
contributed to creative accounting as deviation from them. Perversely,
corporate regulators and the accounting profession are calling for even more
accounting and auditing standards."95 The accounting profession's desire for

90

91

Id.
F.L. CLARKE ET AL, CORPORATE COLLAPSE, REGUATORY, ACCOUNTING, AND ETHICAL

FAILURE 12 (Cambridge University Press 1997).
9

Zeff, supra note 1,at 58.

93

Id.

94

F.L. Clarke et al., supra note 91, at 12.

9s

Id. at 14

20021

THE NUMBERS GAME

more numerous and explicit financial statements stems in part from the
litigious nature ofAmerican society and the consuming battle for clients who
opinion shop before selecting their auditors.' By explicitly imposing detailed
standards on the financial statements, auditors could essentially shield
themselves from liability by citing express provisions from GAAP in defense
of the accounting positions taken, and thereby avoid being held directly
responsible for making those judgments. 7 Auditors would also reduce the
tendency to opinion shop by stressing the unyielding nature and detail of the
standards in defense of the positions taken. The Australian study instead
focuses on the product of the accounting process, the financial statements,
and their ability to convey data accurately, without misrepresentation and
lack of comparability, as opposed to singularly focusing on the process of
accounting and its methodology.98 Topically, understanding the plethora of
new accounting standards may become unmanageable and burdensome,
according to Goldman Sachs' Gabrielle Napolitano, managing director.99
She states, "keeping abreast of changing accounting regulations is not easy.
Investors, analysts, creditors, and corporate executives may find themselves
hard pressed to maintain a comprehensive understanding of the major
proposals introduced."1" More fundamentally, the new SEC initiatives of
demanding stricter compliance with existing standards have had the
unintended effect of producing conflicts with banking industry regulators.
This result was accomplished because of the SEC's continued investigation
of the banking industries loan loss reserves practices./° 1 Traditionally,
banking regulators have permitted and even encouraged banks to record loan
loss reserves in the banks' loan portfolios when disturbed economic
circumstances in the geographic areas serviced by those banks indicate
increased volatility and financial instability."°
The SEC ultimately
scrutinized this conservative approach in its effort to clamp down on the
unscrupulous use of reserves in manipulating earnings. The SEC's scrutiny
led to an unusual joint statement issued by the SEC, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision, in which
they pledged to work together to develop further guidance, and that
"although management's process for determining allowance adequacy is
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judgmental and results in a range of estimated losses, it must not be used to
manipulate earnings or mislead investors, fund providers, regulators or other
affected parties. " " This incident and the vague and amorphous statement
produced by the regulatory agencies is an unusual instance of confusion and
disagreement between the regulators, yet clearly demonstrates the ambiguity
inherent in the current financial reporting model and the uncertainty facing
even informed investors and readers of these documents, who require a high
level of precision and comparability before making important financial
decisions. Absolute reliance on financial statements that purport to faithfully
represent an organization's financial condition, given this cloud of
uncertainty, can have disastrous effects.
The Australian study concludes that "accounting standards have failed to
match the admirable claims of the leaders of the profession - namely, that
compliance with them would reduce the diversity of accounting practices
and thereby provide data relevant to the making of informed financial
assessments." 1°4 The authors add, "Defying financial common sense,
complying with certain practices endorsed by the accounting profession
itself, producing the standard nonsensical, fictional financial outcomes, are
not regarded by either the regulators or (so it seems) the accounting
profession to be a willful indulgence in creative accounting."' 05 This
argument posits that the standard setters' attempts to excise professional
judgment from the financial statements ultimately leads to useful data, a
position strikingly similar to that proposed by the SEC, whose attempts to
impose greater controls over the exercise of that judgment were notably
outlined by Chairman Levitt. Control of the process by which standards are
developed and applied and zealous enforcement of those standards through
strenuous regulatory activity over behavior deemed non-compliant appears
to be the principal mechanism to ensure the stability of the financial
reporting model worldwide. This attempt to excise and regulate judgment
from financial reporting ultimately obviates the need for serious discussion
regarding the quality of the output, rather than the behavior of the input.
The required output is best described as accurate, representative and
comparable financial reporting, from which investors, analysts, creditors, and
the public can fairly assess the financial dynamics of an organization.
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VI. FICTIONAL REPORTING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The authors of the study, similar to Levitt's attacks on certain rogue
accounting practices, described financial reporting practices that produced
fictional and sometimes aberrant statements that were misleading if not
outright fraudulent. These areas include tax effect accounting, which are
methods:
Mandated by the profession to report the financial effects due to
timing or permanent differences between actual taxation payable and
tax payable based on professional accounting treatments of
transactions. Resulting deferred tax standards and credits do not
have any real world referent. They are fictions - fictions that are
legitimately the product of applying the standard.1"6
The authors then follow by stating, "Fictions arise, too, through the artifacts
of consolidated financial statements - goodwill and capital reserves emerging
entirely from the mechanics of consolidation, the elimination of the effects
of transactions between related companies without regard for the actual
financial outcomes and the exacerbated consolidated impact of injecting tax
effect accounting.""'7 Consolidated financial statements are traps for the
unwary, hiding and masking transactions through Byzantine group structures
and idiosyncratic consolidating techniques.' The study suggests that:
Even with modern-day computer power, it is virtually an
impossibility to track through those types of corporate mazes, let
alone determine unambiguously the financial implications of
transactions within them. An essential feature ofgroupthink is that
only the parties to the transaction really now, and believe only they
need to now, the intricacies. Consolidation accounting, in many
ways, helps to secure them to outsiders and, we suggest, perhaps to
most of the insiders too. 1° 9
Consolidation procedures require that inter-group transactions be eliminated
when the financial statements of the group are consolidated, on the theory

106

Id. at 18.

107

Id.

108
109

Id. at 209.
Id. at 211 (emphasis added).

470 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:451
that this procedure eliminates transactions between the group that are not at
arms length and which may in fact be shams. But consolidation accounting
has another, less obvious yet insidious result, it purposely conceals and buries
subsidiary information within the group's consolidation, hiding both the
enlightening and damaging aspects of subsidiary performance within the
whole."0 Furthermore, consolidation accounting purports to represent the
economic activity of a group of legally separate and unique entities under the
fictional mantra of the group."' The Australian study believes that "groups
are being presented as commercial reality. Yet virtually every aspect of the
financial, social and legal setting in which groups operate clearly indicates
they are not." 1 2 Consolidation techniques are the product of relying on
economic form over legal form and financial substance!'1 3 They obfuscate,
confuse, and conceal data that might normally be available to users of
financial statements, and may serve to hide data from shareholders and
creditors that is damaging or otherwise disparaging. Data not found in
unconsolidated financial reports mysteriously appear in consolidated
statements under the guise of economic substance, yet bear little relation to
real world substance and the individual, disaggregated accounts of the
subsidiary." 4 This theory of aggregation is contrary to the norms found in
GAAP, that offull disclosure and careful consideration ofan entities' viability
as a going concern. Meaningful interpretation of operating results, company,
product line, and entity viability are made more difficult."' Consolidation
accounting purports to represent a fictitious legal structure which by its very
nature "lacks legal capacity generally to exercise property rights, sue or be
sued, incur physical or financial damage or impose it upon others; the
statements contradict the legal, social and financial essence which their
constituent corporations enjoy." 116 Countervailing (and popular) arguments
steadfastly hold that the substance over form mantra, very popular since the
1920's, provides shelter and meaning for these consolidation techniques, yet
reason and logic dictates otherwise." 7 Prevailing consolidation techniques
ignore the legal and financial implications that the aggregated assets and
liabilities are neither owned nor made available to the group."' This group
mentality encourages users and readers of financial statements to view the
110
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entities of the consolidated group as virtual branches of the parent, again

creating a dangerous fiction rendering the financial statements less
meaningful and serviceable." 9 The grandest of these fictions, though, is the
assumption engendered by consolidation accounting that profits and losses
of the subsidiary entities will pass through to the parent entity through
dividend payments.'- Consolidated income or loss will rarely be even similar
to the sum of the disaggregated amounts, the usual result of applying
amortization techniques to the assets of the subsidiary. 21 Applying tax effect
accounting throughout the consolidation process, whose group tax
implications will likely never come to fruition, further exacerbates the
anomalies of the consolidation process.'2 The authors of the study conclude
their analysis of consolidation accounting by stating:
Data so contrived, so removed from real-world referents are unlikely
to inform anybody of the wealth and progress of the constituent
companies, either individually or collectively. Despite the financial
obfuscation they facilitate, their counterfactual footings and the
resulting artifacts, surprisingly consolidated financial statements are
perceived by legislative draftsmen, many legal practitioners, the
courts, and many accountants to be a means for lifting the corporate
veil. To the contrary, they appear to achieve precisely the
23
opposite.
The concept of creative accounting can itself spur disagreement over its
intended meaning. 124 The prevailing definition describes creative accounting
as a series of acts of intentional misstatements performed for the purpose of
deception, which deviate significantly from the prevailing accounting
standard.'2 This definition perhaps most closely approximates that of
Chairman Levitt's in its breadth and scope. Other proponents have argued
that creative accounting techniques indeed serve a useful purpose - that of
presenting financial statements as models of the substance of their
transactions, rather than their purely compliant forms.126 While intellectually
appealing and having some merit, this proposition has often been raised in
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defense of many of the practices against which Levitt outlined as intolerable.
This argument presupposes that any benchmark or standard could be applied
against which to measure what constitutes the substance of any given
transaction. The substance of a transaction is indeed a variable and fluid
measurement, one that is open to great variability in judgment and one that
becomes increasingly difficult to measure as the nature and complexity of a
transaction increases. Chairman Levitt's nine point initiative simply
presupposes that betterjudgment, more education, higher ethics, and more
professional training will somehow convey the essence of that substance and
establish the definitive benchmark that will enable a complete class of
financial statements within a given industry to remain completely
comparable and transparent. This shortsighted approach is indeed indicative
of the continuing focus on the inputs, or processes of those financial
statements rather than their outputs: serviceability to consumers,
shareholders, creditors, and the public. One Australian accounting review
committee noted in the 1960's, "there are still more than a million possible
reported sets of accounting data for one company in any one period."' 27 The
Australian study reached some startling conclusions regarding those inputs,
including:
[O]ur view is that, perversely conventional accounting practices
frequently frustrate those attempts to tell the financial truth.
Contrary to the popular view, is our proposition that compliance
with the so-called spirit of many conventional practices and
endorsed standards produces grossly misleading data, without
necessarily any intention to deceive on anybody's part."'
The authors further assert that "much of the rhetoric about creative
accounting has been misplaced. Departure from the standards is, as often as
not, the only way to produce data likely to accord with the financial facts."' 29
The study concludes its assessment of creative accounting by stating that
"instead of producing a perceived improvement in the quality of accounting
data, the increase in the number of standards is correlated positively with
increased complaint, criticism, bewilderment, frustration, disbelief and,
ultimately, increased litigation."' 3° Another report concluded, "Financial
reports move markets. International capital flows will be rational only if
accounting procedures generate reliable information that permits investors
1-7
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to compare income statements and balance sheets from different commercial
cultures." 3 '

VII. THE SEC'S FLAWED RESPONSE AND REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT

Beyond the SEC's growing intolerance of the abuse of standards, which
nonetheless encourage creative accounting and earnings manipulation, lies
the enforcement of those standards, and the future evolution of the
accounting and legal professions. The SEC has concluded that its rigorous
oversight of the profession's self-enforcement regime is the primary means
of ensuring full compliance with those standards.'32 Indeed, many feel that
"an unhappy consequence of the SEC's rigorous enforcement system has
been to inhibit desirable innovations in financial reporting." 33 Furthermore,
they add that the "SEC has engendered a climate of conformity, which has
been hostile to experimentation with nonstandard approaches to measuring
and reporting accounting information in the audited financial statements.""
The report concludes that the SEC has been primarily concerned with "the
potential of financial information to mislead than to inform." 3 The SEC
has shifted this focus somewhat to include discussion of "soft" topics in the
Management Discussion & Analysis section that accompanies the core
financial statements, although their emphasis on misleading information
predominates most SEC disclosure requirements. 3 ' This emphasis has
precluded attention to the development of serviceable financial statements.
The SEC's primary thrust in its oversight of the self-regulatory
mechanism has been the development of the audit independence rules,
which attempt to ensure that auditors remain independent of their clients in
both appearance and fact. Auditors bridge the "information and credibility
gaps which exist between top corporate management and those who are
financially interested in the wealth controlled by such management. " "'
Audits inspire investor confidence by providing credibility to the
management prepared financial statements, and thus secure a central role in
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the operation of the capital markets. 38 Over time, independence issues have
become the cornerstone of Levitt's assault on the self-regulatory regime that
has existed for decades, principally due to the rise in revenues from
consulting services among the Big 5 accounting firms. Consulting revenue
now contributes approximately 51% of their revenue, and continues to grow
three times as fast as the audit component. 39 Consulting services offered by
the Big 5 include: general management, financial management, operations
management, marketing, systems management, public utility services, and
human resources management.' This list is certainly not all-inclusive, and
omits many niche practice specialties such as real estate consulting, which
was developed at Ernst & Young through their acquisition of Kenneth
Leventhal & Company. While many of the firms have recently shed their
consulting practices in an effort to command high value while demand for
these services remains high, the Big 5 fear that Levitt's assault will undermine
their efforts to rebuild or reorganize their practices in the future.' The
primary thrust of Levitt's concerns is the inherent conflicts of interest that
may be generated when one firm is engaged to offer multiple levels of service
to a large corporation, while continuing to audit that entity. Levitt has
alleged a fundamental undermining of the audit regime in the Big 5s' efforts
to aggressively grow their practices. 42 He bases his arguments not on
conclusive evidence of a direct relationship between audit failure and
consulting growth, but in a continuing pattern of audit and accounting
failures and on alarming trends in financial reporting restatements. 143 Levitt
is firmly convinced that auditors are relaxing their vigilance and growing
closer to management in an effort to garner more non-accounting revenue.'"
The reason for this trend is simple: audit and tax growth has remained
stagnant as a percentage of revenues. The number of public companies
requiring audits grew by only 1% from 1993-1999. 4' As the information age
ushers in a plethora of global communications growth and information
processing needs, the Big 5, with their enormous pool of intellectual capital
and their intimate knowledge of the integrative nature of an entities
resources, stand poised to offer these services in a comprehensive one-stop
shop environment. Levitt believes these services can pose serious conflicts
138
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on auditor independence and judgment, as implementation of these services
would force Big 5 firms to essentially assume the role of management. They
would then be forced into the untenable position ofauditing their own work,
a prospect that unnerves even many certified public accountants. 46 Even if
complete objectivity could be retained, the appearance of a conflict is
inevitable, as audit firms devote greater resources to their audit clients in
nontraditional practice areas, especially if those areas are of an operational
nature.

147

In response to these warnings and motivation from a sharply worded
GAO report issued in 1996, the accounting profession and the SEC agreed
in 1997 to establish the private Independence Standards Board.148 The ISB's
mission was to develop a conceptual framework through which future
regulations could be filtered, identification ofemerging independence issues,
and providing practitioner guidance in this field.' 49 However, trouble for the
ISB quickly ensued as Levitt challenged the initial composition ofthe Board's
membership, complaining that accountants or their allies held most of the
positions on the Board. °
Furthermore, a 1998 probe of
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that a great number of employees were
purchasing stock in the companies which the firm audited, which is strictly
prohibited under past and current independence rules and is one of the
primary underpinnings of the independence rules."' Approximately half of
the firms' partners had violated the rules, and nearly 8,000 violations were
discovered. 2 Several high profile cases before the SEC also cast a pall over
the professions deemed independence. In one of those cases, MicroStrategy
Inc.'s restatement of three years of financial reports cost shareholders $10.4
billion in one week." 3 It was subsequently discovered that numerous
financial ties existed between the software company and its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, which was also a reseller of its software." s Additionally,
the SEC alleges that the two companies attempted to hide their financial ties
by using a third party as an intermediary.'
Another high profile case
involves Waste Management and Arthur Andersen, its auditor of over thirty
years, in which the SEC alleged a revolving door policy existed between the
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company and its auditor, extensive cross selling of consulting services by its
auditors which included the payment of bonuses to members of the audit
team, and excessively high consulting fees. 5 6 The SEC alleges that these
financial jackpots created powerful incentives in forcingArthur Andersen to
accept Waste Management's earnings manipulation and creative accounting
practices, which resulted in an $859 million loss in market capitalization and
a restatement of income, and included a $3.5 million charge against earnings
as far back as 1992.' While these cases do not represent proof positive of a
direct correlation between consulting services and impairment of auditing
services, the tone and tenor of the SEC's remarks indicate that it believes
such a relationship exists.
Levitt proceeded on his crusade to vigorously enforce the independence
rules, which he believed were crippling the integrity of the financial
reporting model, from which investor confidence ultimately derived, and in
June of 2000 proposed the most sweeping independence rules in decades.
The proposed rules would have banned ten categories of non-audit services,
which included: bookkeeping services, financial information systems design
and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services,
internal audit outsourcing, assumption of decision-making or supervisory
functions, human resources, broker dealer or investment adviser status, legal
services, experts services, and a catch-all provision designed to prohibit
appearance based conflicts. 5 These rules, if implemented, would have
required massive restructuring of the accounting and auditing profession.
Although the proposals were substantial and far reaching, opposition to their
implementation was equally vociferous. Although the final regulations, set
forth in December 2000, enacted most of the same prohibitions enumerated
in their June proposal, the SEC succumbed to relentless political pressure
and significantly diluted the outright ban on information technology services,
which was the most significant of the ten categories initially proposed.5 9
Additionally, the outright ban on the internal audit outsourcing was
significantly diluted."o In many respects, the new regulations simply codify
existing regulations, and were viewed as a victory for the accounting
profession.' 6' Significantly, though, the ban includes a prohibition on the
rendering of legal services, which could seriously hamper the efforts by many
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of the Big 5 to develop successful law practices in North America as they
have done in Europe. This ban, coupled with current ABA prohibitions on
multidisciplinary practices, could successfully block efforts to develop
completely integrated accounting and legal practices. As the regulations were
just announced in December of 2000, it is still too early to determine their
actual significance in this area. Judicial or legislative fiat, for many years the
bulwark of the accounting lobby, could successfully erode this prohibition.
VIII. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT WISDOM

The SEC has recently demonstrated a willingness to dramatically
increase its authorized oversight of the accounting profession and
correspondingly decrease the professions self-regulatory nature. Its
willingness to pre-empt the Independence Standards Board, a Board it
willingly approved and helped fashion, should sound a cautionary note
throughout the profession. Chairperson Levitt's re-distribution of the FAF
Board and his desire to dramatically increase enforcement efforts at the SEC
demonstrate increased willingness to expand its direct regulatory powers.
However diluted, his successful efforts to implement and codify new
independence standards could spell a death knell for the complete integration
of the accounting and legal professions. At a minimum, these efforts could
lead to protracted battles at the federal and state level, as individual states,
which act as regulatory gatekeepers, attempt to harmonize their rules with
the federal mandates. Intense lobbying of the legislative and executive
branches by those hoping to develop true MDP's, could lead to epic struggles
that could ultimately shape the nature of the profession's regulatory design.
Indeed, many continue to question the wisdom of allowing the standard
setting and enforcement mechanisms of the profession to be guided by the
premise of self-regulation, noting that investor confidence in the largest
capital markets in the world largely depend upon their decisions and
judgments. Levitt has echoed these sentiments from his bully pulpit,
demanding greater transparency and comparability from the financial
reporting system. In a far-reaching interview, Levitt publicly condemned the
accounting profession, and stated, "The accounting profession, and
particularly the AICPA, have been almost oblivious to the words public
interest. Independence, full disclosure, and public perceptions - which the
accounting industry dismisses as a relevant - or the cornerstones that have
made our markets the best in the world."162 He concluded by saying:
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Our markets are based on perceptions. That's what fuels public
confidence, that's what moves the markets. The number of
accounting misdeeds and the high profile failures and the managedearnings cases are what have eroded public confidence. It's the
commission's job to provide for full disclosure and reporting that is
as accurate as possible. And with self-regulation, perception is
doubly important."3
Levitt's goals and intentions are accurate in their service of the investing
public, but the substance of his criticisms and his proposed changes do little
to mitigate the dangers of earnings management. They instead focus on
individual misdeeds and the need for greater regulatory efforts, rather than
on the serviceability of the financial reporting model as presently structured.
This "cult of personality" has in fact diverted attention away from
fundamental restructuring towards individual scapegoats and single instances
of ethics failures, bad management, and inadequate educational resources.'"
While many of these individual failures warrant serious attention and
enforcement, the zealous blame heaped upon them obscures accountings
failings as a reporting mechanism through which the consumer may feel
justified in placing full and unquestioned reliance. Indeed, "professional
accountancy bodies suggest that the remedy is more education - educate the
public on the limited utility of traditional accounting information. This
approach is a curious example of caveat emptor." 65 In their most blistering
criticism of the study, the Australian authors focused directly on the
regulatory maze in the United States, which parallels in many respects that
found in Australia, and concluded that:
Regulation through threat of sanction for noncompliance with the
prescribed rules appears to have been spawned by the push for a
formula approach to financial disclosure - the cookbook approach.
Central to that theme has been the philosophy that the greater the
number of rules, the more predictable the regulators' behavior, the
less accountants exercise professional judgment - the more effective
the regulation. Perversely, the greater the regulation less reliable
accounting has become, and a fatal attrition of accountants'
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professional judgment has become more of a reality than a mere
possibility.' 66
The contrast between assurances given to consumers of ordinary goods and
services and that given to users of financial statements has never been more
revealing, in that both groups of users have nearly identical expectations of
the end products, the presumptions of serviceability.1 67 Even the time
honored warranty of fitness for a particular purpose notable in the consumer
goods arena may reasonably apply, if only through common sense, in that it
is reasonable to assume that accounting data "are fit to be used to calculate a
variety of financial ratios whose products will be indicative of the Company's
financial characteristics -- solvency, liquidity" and other crucial performance
measures through which a realistic portrait of an organizations viability and
financial health and strength will emerge."'
IX. THE REFORMATION
Chairman Levitt recently announced his retirement, and the incoming
administration has yet to appoint his successor. The incoming chairperson
will play a pivotal role in shaping the accounting profession. This change
notwithstanding, while the trend towards increased vigilance of earnings
management and zealous enforcement may sometimes deter the brazen and
unscrupulous, it will not, however, deter honest accountants from applying
prescriptive standards to financial data, often leading to bizarre and
unintended results. Accounting failures are many times the results ofpoorly
constructed standards that have no legal or economic basis. The mantra of
substance over form so dearly cherished by those in the accounting
community fails to reveal and clarify the arcane ambiguities of consolidation
accounting and historical, cost based financial reporting. Levitt's goals are
sweeping and substantive, yet his methods cosmetic and superficial. The real
issues have yet to be addressed by any private or governmental regulatory
agency. The status quo has pervaded the national conscious for decades, and
has entrenched itself in a generation of accountants bred through Big 5
indoctrination and gospel. The captains of industry, board members of the
regulatory agencies, and members of the national accounting firms share
common ground in seeking to avoid disruptive change. The accounting
industry seeks, most importantly, to avoid liability, and the cookbook
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standards pervasive today well accomplish that goal. Captains of industry
seek to manipulate accounting data to create financial reports that view their
organization most favorably. Regulatory agency members are often products
of private industry, as many are tapped directly from the boardrooms of
corporate America and the accounting industry, hence, they too have no
incentive to seek substantive reform of our financial reporting system.
Substantial modification of the financial reporting model would involve
reform of financial consolidation principles, to reflect the legal and economic
reality of the corporate structure. A shift to fair value accounting (assets and
liabilities valued at their real world referents) would prevent the gross
miscalculations ofvalue that continue toplague analysis of corporate stability
and liquidity. Valuation analysis would be greatly simplified and unshackled
of the costs of engaging in costly valuation analysis in determining current
asset value. Indeed, fixed asset depreciation models and real property
accounting are little more than cookbook applications having little economic
substance. In light of these inadequacies, it is not surprising that expert
investment analysts are unable to fairly evaluate company performance and
future potential, as financial ratios based on inaccurate financial statements
are useless at best and deceptive or fraudulent at worst.
Unlike the British Commonwealth, the Unites States does not recognize
the subjective override of the true andfair value standard, which demands
representational faithfulness of the financial statements, irrespective of the
raw financial reporting, but instead mandates conformity with GAAP as the
prevailing standard. 69 The literal meaning of conformity implies strict
compliance and non-deviance. This standard has failed the test of
representational faithfulness. Furthermore:
What is inexplicable is the promotion of the idea that the way to
repair the damaged image of accounting and auditing is to have
consumers understand that accounting data are not serviceable, that
published financial statements are limited in their function - do not
disclose the wealth and progress of companies; and that whereas they
are to be declared true and fair, they are no such thing. That is, to
explain that there is not so much an expectation gap as what amounts
to a performance gap... From the published financial statements
it remains impossible to assess the wealth and progress ofa company,
virtually impossible to calculate reliable indicators of solvency, rate
of return, asset backing, gearing and the like. Published financial
statements contained data which are mere artifacts of the processing
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rules imposed upon accountants through the compulsory imposition
of accounting standards, some of which lead to data being pure
fiction. The latter are not merely unrepresentative of what they
they have nothing to describe, no referent in the real
describe;
70
world.
This scathing analysis of the present state of the accounting profession
represents a clarion call to our economic leaders to demand structural
changes in the way financial data are prepared and packaged. Otherwise, the
accounting profession itself may be in jeopardy of losing claim to that very
term. A technician can easily replace a professional's judgment, if the only
required expertise is that of engaging a complex set of rules and
procedures.17' Levitt has the right idea, but the wrong method.
X EPILOGuE: ENRON

The fall of the house of Enron, the huge energy-trading conglomerate,
in late 2001, has thrust the often arcane and academic accounting community
into the public spotlight, a position it neither seeks nor relishes. This paper
was completed almost eight months before Enron's debacle, yet little
academic research or guidance existed to foretell the likelihood of such a
catastrophe. Indeed, other than the often-excited utterances of former SEC
chair Arthur Levitt, it was difficult to find sympathy for even minor changes
or revisions to existing paradigmsand structures. Substantial lobbying efforts
by the accounting community often guaranteed the failure of even a
modicum of reform. The failure of the Enron Corporation, though,
profoundly changed this focus and elevated Levitt to near mythical stature in
the financial community. Enron's failures have barely begun to be
understood, and it's tangled web of hundreds or thousands of partnerships,
off-balance sheet financing mechanisms, and complicated hedge's may
require years of analysis and thousands of hours of resources to untangle.
Enron's failure was so complete, its efforts to obfuscate so thorough and
pervasive, that the financial community, and indeed the entire country, is in
the throes of perhaps the grandest collusive fraud perpetrated in the nations
history.
Enron's collatse clearlv demonstrates the u'ossiv inadeauate nature of
public debate and understanding of financial statement inadecuacv. This. at
a time when earnings manipulation is easily achieved by creative accountants
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adhering to the letter but not the spirit of the financial accounting rules.
Strict adherence to these rules bv auditors has resulted in less transDarencv
and greatlv diminished levels of auditor judgment. As auditor iudement is
replaced bv standards that encourage a formulaic cookbook approach, it is easv
for the auditor to absolve himself of the need to review the financial
statements for transparencv and disclosure, and instead point to the GAAP
and GAAS statutes as safe harbors. It may be ghastlv to think that the Enron
auditors complied with the letter of these standards (and the law) vet
succeeded in creating the most tangled set of financial statements ever
assembled. The failure lies largelv in the principles themselves and the lack
of professional accountability amongst auditors. Auditor judgment has been
replaced bv this formulaic adherence to the standards. Additionallv, the
conflict of interest created bv performing consulting engagements. which
tvpicallv generate manv times the audit revenue, and that of opining on the
fairness of the same company's financial reporting mechanism, is obvious.
Audit firms that also serve as internal auditors for these companies mav also
be compromised in their ability to be fair and objective. Finally, selfregulation has been a failure, as industry guidelines and regulation methods
have been ineffectual in curbing these excesses.
The profound changes recuired mav rallv the accounting communitv to
bitterlv resist these changes at the Congressional level, the Executive branch
(the SEC). and within the industrv itself. Arthur Levitt fought a continual
battle to reform some of the problems, vet was defeated on almost everv
important initiative. Harvev Pitt. the current SEC chairperson, is a former
defender and lawver of the Big 5. and mav succumb to pressure to maintain
the status ouo.17 2 Enron mav ultimately be rearded as a lone criminal
misadventure, and a cosmetic regulatory scheme will replace the recentlv
resigned Public Oversiaht Board. 173 Given the current administration's
zealous de-reulatorv advocacv. significant changes in both the structure of
accounting self-regulation and the rule making process mav be difficult and
seem unlikelv. Cosmetic changes will likely be instituted, as imminent
Congressional elections may motivate minimalist reform. The average
person will be none the wiser. believing that those responsible have been
brought to Justice. vet earnings manipulation will continue apace. The few
who understand the depth of the problem will simply continue to watch the
largest con game ever devised, hoping that their investments do not fall prey
to these scams.
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